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Making Sense of Alternativity in Leisure and Culture: Back to Sub-Culture? 
Karl Spracklen, Leeds Beckett University, UK 
Introduction 
What does it mean to be alternative? What is alternativity, and how does it relate to other 
attempts to make sense of those on the margins? The contents of this edited collection show 
that academics are beginning to grapple with these questions. Our contributors are already 
tackling the problem and building a picture of alternativity today – from the wonderful fashions 
of mediated sea-punk and heavy metal to gender fluidity and radical politics. The contents of 
the book so far show the seriousness of the research programme, and the complexity of the 
theoretical frameworks put into place: feminist, Marxist, post-Marxist, post-structuralist, 
postmodern, liquid. But there is still much work to be done to turn this work into a working 
theory and empirical programme about the alternative.  
This chapter is informed by the diversity and depth of the chapters that have come 
before it, as well as my own interest in leisure studies and what might be called the sociology 
of leisure and culture. In the first part of this chapter, I will undertake a history and philosophy 
of alternativity, from deviance through sub-cultures to neo-tribes. This will focus on four 
related conceptual frames: the deep history of alternativity; notions of alternativity in classical 
Greece and Rome and in the Abrahamic religions; popular notions of alternativity in what 
might be called the age of modernity; and academic attempts to understand it in various 
disciplines and subject fields. In the second part of the chapter, I will focus on how alternativity 
has been explored in two specific subject fields – leisure studies and popular cultural studies – 
to make the claim that both subject fields have failed, for different reasons, to get to grips with 
the idea of the alternative: leisure studies has failed through a lack of theory; and cultural 
studies has failed through a lack of empirical research. In the final part of the chapter, I will 
attempt to reconcile leisure and culture, and I will sketch out a new theory and empirical 
programme of alternative leisure that returns to the idea of sub-culture as counter culture. 
A History and Philosophy of Alternativity 
A Deep History of Alternativity 
Modern humans have evolved from earlier mammal species, and have retained the social 
hierarchies and social behaviour of those ancestors, which we can see at work in our 
evolutionary cousins: chimpanzees, gorillas, monkeys and so on (Smail, 2007). These animals 
develop closely-related groups in which dominance hierarchies operate as a social norm. 
Individuals know their place in the pecking order, and the social norms of acceptable behaviour 
are learned through imitation, learning and experience. In the long, deep history of human 
evolution, humans acquired language, culture and self-consciousness, but retained much of the 
social order of our ancestors. Being alternative, thinking differently to the norm, must have 
emerged in this unknowable period.1 In the thousands of years of pre-history in which we 
retained a hunter-gatherer lifestyle, the small communities in which we lived did not generally 
allow for individual rejection of the norms and values of the group: this is the period in which 
families, customs and ultimately religion are constructed through culture to maintain the social 
order. The norms of the community could be used to reject those who did not contribute to the 
community, and those who rejected the values of the community. Behaviour, then, was strictly 
controlled, as can be evidenced in similar cultures explored by anthropologists (Britt & Cuffel, 
2007; Turner, 1969). Although some individuals presumably rejected the norms and values of 
their communities because they wanted to live in an alternative fashion according to different 
rules, it is difficult to know for certain what happened to them in the tens of thousands of years 
of pre-history. We can speculate that some individuals may have chosen to leave their 
communities to try to live alone or with others, and some individuals were certainly ostracized 
or killed for rejecting the norms and values. In many other cases, those individuals were 
probably the original exemplars of the liminal types who lived on the margins of pre-modern 
cultures: the magicians, the wise women, and others co-opted by the community and its social 
order to serve variously as scapegoats and interlocutors between the gods and humans (Turner, 
1969). This liminal function served the hegemonic order of the ruling powers of the 
community: alternativity was a way of marking out those who were to be blamed for any 
problem such as famine or plague; it was also a way of showing the rest of the community what 
happened when people transgressed. 
With the development of agriculture, new social norms and values emerged in human 
communities (Scott, 2017). Surplus resources led to more humans, which led to the rise of 
villages, towns and cities. Formal religions established complicated rituals of prayers and 
sacrifice. Political and economic power was concentrated in the hands of fewer people, who 
constructed for themselves myths of divine favour and purity of blood. In the rural spaces that 
underpinned these cultures, the social order was essentially constructed as it had been before 
agriculture, but conformity was also policed through the power of the ruling elites: farm-
1 One could argue that thinking differently conferred and evolutionary advantage in a world that changed 
dramatically over the time humans evolved. But there is no way to test this. 
workers became bonded serfs, or slaves, brutalized and kept in their place (Britt & Cuffel, 
2007). Thinking or behaving alternative must have continued as always, but there was no 
tolerance of dissent in such conditions. However, the towns and cities that emerged in this 
period of history were spaces that provided the opportunity to be alternative. Firstly, the new 
towns and cities enabled individual citizens to build their own wealth and find time to be at 
leisure. Secondly, the new towns and cities developed new forms of culture and leisure that 
questioned the old order’s norms and values. And finally, the new towns and cities helped the 
dissemination of ideas through the invention of writing and the rise of literacy. 
The Alternative in the Classical Period and in the Abrahamic Religions 
We can see evidence of alternativity in the literature that has survived from this period, 
which has shaped and defined much of Western society: the secular literature of Classical 
Rome and Greece; and the sacred literature of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Both these 
literatures have been used to define belonging and exclusion through the last few thousand 
years, but that belonging and exclusion has been re-shaped through the years of transmission 
and reception. 
In the culture and society of Classical Greece, there was some freedom to be alternative 
and to disagree with the norms and values of mainstream society – providing one was a free 
(male) citizen of the city in which you lived, or one had the protection of a city’s ruling elites. 
In the city-states of Greece, free men with wealth could debate matters of state and matters of 
philosophy: asking questions about how to live the good life could mean rejecting the social 
order, the norms and values, and the stories. It was possible to be a philosopher who challenged 
myths and struggled with the gods; it as possible to be an atheist, to be a cynic about morals, 
or a sceptic about true knowledge (Whitmarsh, 2016, 2017). Similarly, it was possible to write 
plays for the theatre that played with this theme of struggling with and rejecting the norms of 
the mainstream (Walton, 2015). And beyond philosophy and the arts, alternativity – or rather, 
liminality - was tolerated in the diversity of religious practices that took place in the Greek 
world, and the hybrid nature of cults that originated in Greek city-states in the East and in 
Africa and Egypt. All these ideas – rejecting norms and values in philosophy and theatre, 
embracing hybridity and liminality in the adoption of Othered cults – were adopted by the 
Romans, who adopted Greek culture whole-heartedly, especially following the invasion and 
conquest of Greece. With the spread of Roman cities and Roman society came an elite culture 
that valued – or at least allowed – alternative, counter-hegemonic ideas to be discussed. 
Alongside that was an urban popular culture in which the liminal, transgressive could be 
celebrated through festivals and sacred rites (Teixidor, 2015). Both forms of alternative culture 
suffered attacks and legislation from moralists among the ruling elites, and the Stoicism that 
dominated Roman philosophy is a school that embraces conformity for the good of the soul – 
but these spaces and modes of transmission for alternativity survived hundreds of years 
(Whitmarsh, 2016). 
The decline of these classical forms of alternativity was a direct result of the 
Christianization of the Roman Empire. Under successive Christian Roman emperors, 
polytheism and variants of Christianity not acknowledged as orthodox were banned. Secular 
philosophy was constrained and Christianized, and secular culture was limited or banned 
altogether (Cameron, 2010; Whitmarsh, 2016). Christianity took its idea of exclusive divine 
truth from Judaism: both of these religions had lists of things banned and things allowed, and 
both of these religions saw their believers as the only people with the moral guide to 
immortality.2 It was Catholic Christianity, though, which became the most important force in 
shaping Western society, as that society developed out of the Roman Empire into Medieval 
Christendom. In this society, the Pope controlled orthodox belief, and the Church justified the 
divine right of kings to rule and make laws (Southern, 2016). Christian Europe in this period 
believed that any deviation from - or transgression of – the norms and values of society was 
the work of the Devil, or the work of individual sinners inspired by the Devil (Stanford, 2010). 
Being alternative was severely limited and subject to punishments, whether it was being Jewish 
outside the spaces allowed to Jews, or wearing clothes not allowed for one’s social class, or 
reading a text banned from the university curriculum. When Luther rejected Papal authority 
and Christendom was torn between Catholicism and Protestantism, both halves of western 
Europe believed in Good and Evil culture and behaviour, and the work and influence of the 
Devil in everyday life (ibid.). Indeed, the more extreme forms of Protestantism believed firmly 
in moral rectitude in a way that reflects the behavior of conservatives in Islam: rejecting music, 
dancing and alcohol as ways of temptation in the profane space, and rejecting idolatry in the 
scared (Acheson, 2014). In this long Christian millennium, alternativity was not allowed, or it 
was identified the work of the Devil and subject to the fires of purification.3 
Popular Notions of Alternativity 
2 The exact same moral certainty about belonging through following the rules in the book can be found in 
other religions, and Islam is a close relation of Judaism and Christianity not just in terms of geography and 
history, but in moral philosophy too. 
3 Liminal spaces and transgressive practices and identities continued, for example harvest festivals, taverns and 
carnivals. The intrinsic need by some humans to be alternative, the need to transgress, had to be met 
somehow. Medieval states and Popes did not have the structures or resources to successfully police 
transgression, so people could evade censure and punishment – but as Elias (1978, 1982) shows, the controls 
got tighter and more effective the nearer Europe came to modernity. 
Being alternative was made possible by the Enlightenment. As Habermas (1989) 
shows, the Enlightenment was a result of the rise of capitalism, the rise of mercantile classes 
and the free exchange of ideas possible in the coffee shops and urban spaces of Europe. In this 
period, philosophers, poets and other writers started to explore the possibility of challenging 
the norms and values of Church and Palace. Young people growing into adulthood could read 
books that argued that all the assumptions about the truth and timelessness of polite society 
were a nonsense (Israel, 2009). Young people stated to wear fashions and do things in their 
leisure that marked them as alternative. In Rousseau, these people found alternative ways to 
live away from the evils of society (O’Dea, 2016); in Voltaire, they found alternative political 
spaces that rejected received wisdom (Pearson, 2005); in Goethe’s young Werther, they found 
the idea of the doomed romantic, someone who rejects the awfulness and fakeness of modernity 
with his own life (Jack, 2014). 
As the radical ideology of the Enlightenment was defeated by the combination of the 
reactionary traditional conservative elites and the new industrialists, alternativity as anti-
modernity was expressed through the nineteenth-century (McFarland, 2014). Following 
Rousseau and Goethe, this counter-hegemonic movement retreated from the cities to find 
meaning and purpose in utopian communities, farms and anarcho-syndicalist organisations 
(Guarneri, 1994). At the same time, modern capitalism started to commodify the young 
Romantics in Europe and the West, with books, plays and magazines and newspapers sold that 
explored the idea of rejecting the mainstream and finding one’s true self through being 
alternative. These ideas of alternativity were consumed by young people searching for meaning 
in the brutal reality of Empire and Industry: these searchers at the end of the nineteenth-century 
found atheism and science, socialism and communism, vegetarianism and feminism, but also 
nationalism and anti-Semitism (Miller, 2013). 
The two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century were a consequence of this 
break with tradition and the search for something alternative, authentic, new. The wars did not 
disrupt the commodification of alternativity, though entire generations of consumers were lost 
in the horror. The brutality did not stop the development of the culture industries, and the rise 
of popular culture as mass culture. The brutality did encourage many young people to reject 
the nationalism and mainstream values that had shaped it, and these people continued to shape 
their alternative lifestyles and values. The invention of cinema, radio, music records and 
television focused the energy of marketing divisions on targeting those consumers still able to 
consume: young people in the West, factory workers with disposable income, the growing 
number of white-collar workers. All these were sold products that made them feel good, and 
made them feel that they belonged to the West (Briggs & Burke, 2009). But part of that 
capitalist market was designed to appeal to people who did not feel they belonged, and wanted 
something to buy that allowed them to feel they rejected the mainstream. So, as individuals 
experimented with alternative lifestyles and politics in the second-half of the last century, 
trying to reject capitalism and the mainstream, they found capitalists trying to sell them the 
alternative lifestyle through material culture and leisure. 
Today, then, alternativity has a specific place in popular culture. It is a form of 
disobedience exemplified by the bikers in The Wild One, something that is transgressive and 
dangerous but only up to a point. It is tolerated, and tolerable. The fashions and nihilism attract 
young people to them as a phase of teenage rebellion – but most grow up and grow out of it. If 
this stereotype from popular culture is true, what does it mean for those who stay alternative? 
I will answer that later in the chapter. 
Academic Theories of Alternativity 
Most of the research about alternativity comes from social scientific attempts to make 
sense about the problem of deviancy. This research has been funded by governments trying to 
keep order in the period of late modernity (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2010). Individuals who are 
alternative are deemed to be abnormal, deviant and lacking some psycho-social that nurtures 
conformity and respect for the social order (Akers, 2011). This academic literature on deviancy 
has increased as the problems of rationalization and modernity have led to entire generations 
of young people left with uncertain futures. These young people have been identified as 
potential sources of social unrest, and what is euphemistically called anti-social behavior. 
Policy-makers trying to tackle this deviancy look for easy solutions, such as predicting the 
likelihood of anti-social behavior from other forms of abnormal behaviour (having a tattoo, 
listening to heavy metal music – that is all the things we might call alternative); or asking if 
there is a genetic cause of deviancy. Academics working on deviancy often provide easy 
answers that give the policy-makers the link between alternative culture and deviancy: heavy 
metal, in particular, has been claimed to be the source of a multitude of sins against decent 
Western society by hundreds of social psychologists (Brown, 2011). 
The more interesting sustained academic lens on alternativity has come from radical 
sociology, feminist sociology and radical youth studies. All this work takes a structuralist 
epistemology to the notion of the alternative, and it is all inspired by the work of Stuart Hall, 
and his colleagues at the CCCS. For Hall (2016), youth cultures have the possibility of being 
counter cultural when they provide Gramscian counter-hegemonic agency to the youth who are 
in those cultural spaces (Gramsci, 1971). Drawing on ideas about emergent, dominant and 
residual culture sketched out by Raymond Williams (1977), Hall finds the counter-cultural 
status of any given youth culture is contingent on the circumstances of its formation, and on 
the stage in Williams’ model at which it sits. For Hall, then, to be an alternative culture is to be 
genuinely counter-cultural, running against the dominant popular culture’s hegemony, and 
challenging that hegemonic status. Historically, in the second half go the twentieth century and 
into the current century, few if any alternative youth cultures have been genuinely 
transformative of the mainstream in the way Hall hoped.4 Most counter-cultural movements 
have either been co-opted by capitalism and commodification into the mainstream (such as 
soap operas having token goths dressed a bit spookily as main characters, as Coronation Street 
in the United Kingdom did with Sophie Webster), or they have faded away as residual cultures 
like the Teddy Boys. 
In response to Hall, others have posited that alternative youth cultures might be better 
understood as sub-cultures. Hebdige (1979) suggests that alternative cultures are spaces where 
individuals can do identity work, adapting and changing previous fashions and tastes to make 
novel sub-cultures. Hebdige agrees with Hall that most alternative youth culture is a product 
of capitalism and the mainstream culture, and essentially dismisses the sub-culture around him 
at the time (punk and skinhead) as failing to be counter-cultural and counter-hegemonic. 
Despite that, Hebdige’s notion of sub-culture has been adopted by most academics over the 
years who have studied alternativity, and has been taken to indicate individual agency and 
autonomy in people choosing to be alternative. More recently, Bennett (1999, 2005) and others 
have argued that sub-culture is a term fixed in the Gramscian world-view of Hall and Hebdige, 
and the world has changed since they were mapping the struggle between capitalism and the 
working classes. In this new world of fluid identities, postmodern power relationships and 
globalization, it is better to see alternative cultures as being neo-tribes. These neo-tribes are 
identities, fashions and tastes individuals can choose to inhabit and belong to as they wish – 
we all, says Maffesoli (1996), have multiple neo-tribes we choose to belong to, crossing from 
one to the other as easy as switching web-sites. 
Alternativity in Leisure Studies and Popular Cultural Studies 
Alternativity in Leisure Studies5 
4 Hall had hopes for Rastafarianism, but it has (so far) failed to effect change. 
5 I base much of this analysis of Stebbins and Rojek on a paper I published critiquing their theories of dark 
leisure (Spracklen, 2017). 
In leisure studies, there is a glaring absence of theories on alternativity. There is a small but 
significant portfolio of research on alternativity, sub-cultures, neo-tribes, transgression, music 
and lifestyles. There is a clear interest in the leisure lives of the marginal, but that interest comes 
with a belief in social justice and the emancipatory potential of good forms of leisure 
(Spracklen, 2009, 2011). 
The most salient theories on alternativity in leisure studies come from debates about 
dark leisure – or, rather, from arguments about deviant leisure and abnormal leisure. The first 
and most significant theory of deviant leisure appears in the work of Robert Stebbins (1996, 
1997, 2001), as another category of leisure alongside the categories of serious leisure and 
casual leisure previously defined and explored by Stebbins (1982), and what he later called 
project-based leisure (Stebbins, 2005). Deviant leisure can be casual or serious, with casual 
deviant leisure being the tolerable kind undertaken for pleasure, and serious deviant leisure 
being more pre-planned and intolerable (such as murdering someone). Stebbins (1997) is 
working here with a traditional, psychological model of what is considered to be deviance. 
Deviance is un-problematically accepted as unacceptable behaviour, the actions of those 
considered by priests, law-makers and elites as beyond the pale of ‘normal’ society. But what 
is intolerable, what is tolerable, and what is not deviant at all in leisure according to Stebbins 
is defined by societal norms and values that frame his worldview. The consequences for 
Stebbins (2001) is that hedonist leisure behaviour brings dangers to health and to society. 
The most important contribution to dark leisure in leisure theory comes in the work of 
Chris Rojek (1995, 1999, 2000, 2010). In Rojek (1999) he defines and discusses what he calls 
abnormal leisure, a synonym for deviant leisure or dark leisure. Rojek argues that there are 
three specific forms of abnormal leisure: invasive; mephitic; and wild. All these three forms 
can be combined to account for and explain the need for all kinds of abnormal leisure. Rojek 
believes that abnormal leisure is a product of the crisis of the self in late modernity: a 
consequence of the rise of alienation, post-industrialization and liquidity (a theme he returns to 
in Rojek, 2010). Each of the three forms are particular responses to this existential condition. 
In describing the three forms Rojek comes closest the idea of alternativity emerging in my brief 
history and philosophy. Mephitic leisure is a long-term and carefully planned response to 
alienation. It is a rational turn for individuals. But mephitic leisure is related to the third, most 
transgresssive form of abnormal leisure, wild leisure. Wild leisure is an intermittent and truly 
liminal response to contemporary conditions, although Rojek is drawing on older ideas of the 
carnivalesque and transgression in the work of Bakhtin (1984). Historically, societies have 
always experienced mephitic and wild leisure, with individuals and groups profaning laws and 
morals, and with organised mephitic leisure being transformed into wild leisure by those actors 
who take it too far. Rojek seems to believe that wild leisure is more likely to occur than 
mephitic leisure these days, because the rules that govern and control mephitic leisure are so 
harsh in late modernity that individuals feel they have no choice than to be wild. 
So far, Stebbins and Rojek are the only theorists in leisure studies who have 
contemplated alternativity, but only through the lens of dark leisure. In Stebbins’ social 
psychological modelling, being alternative becomes morally questionable deviant leisure. For 
Rojek, being alternative is a way of resisting capitalism and the alienation of modernity. He 
sees alternativity as mephitic leisure when it is mimetic and a response to alienation, or wild 
leisure when it is truly transgressive. The problem with Rojek’s abnormal leisure is the 
circularity of its argument: abnormal leisure is leisure that is abnormal. This leaves little room 
to provide a critical analysis of the abnormal in culture and leisure, what is the alternative 
culture. Can a way forward be found in cultural sociology, cultural studies, and media and 
communication studies – what might collectively be called popular cultural studies? 
Alternativity in Popular Cultural Studies 
An analysis of the sprawling range of popular cultural studies shows that although there 
are many academic writing on alternativity (witness the contributors to this collection), there 
is no consistent critical approach to the problem of the alternative. I contend there are four 
related reasons what this is the case. 
The first reason for the lack of consistency is the problem of aesthetics and assumptions 
about the importance of particular cultural or sub-cultural forms. We can see this at work in 
popular music studies. This subject field has been dominated by researchers and theorists who 
have established a canon of artists and genres, which is aesthetically and politically acceptable 
as the subject of criticism. So, for instance, Bob Dylan and Bob Marley and punk are considered 
to be worthy of special issues, edited collections and conferences. The taste-makers in the 
subject field like these artists and genres and think the music is worthy, and people who write 
about these artists and genres and the others in the canon find it easier to have their work 
accepted. Punk is seen as truly alternative so that is in the canon, but until recently heavy metal 
was dismissed as unauthentic and hence not alternative and not worthy of being considered for 
serious critical analysis. This is tied up with a related problem of the fetishization of formal 
aesthetic theory and material practice over sociological critique. Again, in popular music 
studies, this can be seen in the favouring of work that provides musicological analysis over 
ethnographic analysis in the writing of Tagg (2011) and others like him. 
The second reason for the lack of consistency in the critical analysis of alternativity is 
the continued adherence to some form of postmodernism, post-structuralism, and/or some other 
form of postmodern epistemology and ontology. There are too many authors claiming there is 
no truth, just one narrative or discourse among many others, with every truth and no truth being 
equally true. The slide towards neo-tribes is a perfect example of this post-something fallacy: 
essentially all choice and all agency is identified as having equal value, and we are left with 
the idea that the poor of the world just need to change the music they are streaming (through 
their non-existent phones? – Spracklen, 2015) to find meaning and purpose and equality. There 
is some value in the work of post-modernists and post-structuralists, but much of it is complete 
nonsense. If we deny social reality and the ability to identify it, we deny doing any sociology 
and making any difference to the world. We want to able to say people with power are 
egregious, and we want to be able to say that they maintain that power through the manipulation 
of popular culture and the repression of the lower classes, women, minorities and others. 
The third reason for the lack of consistency is the geographical or methodological turn. 
Following Thrift (2007), many academics in popular cultural studies have abandoned thinking 
in terms of culture as culture is representational. Instead these academics try to capture 
snapshots of people and objects interacting in spaces. This produces some marvellous 
narratives, and some outstanding description. But if we as academics fail to try to explain what 
we are trying to research, then it becomes a form of voyeurism and Othering: we just go to the 
space and point at the people in it. 
The final reason is the relational turn in cultural sociology: too many academics in this 
subject field have been mesmerised by Bourdieu (1986), and want either to defend him and his 
methods strongly, or to argue about the weaknesses of his work and his methods. There is much 
that is useful in Bourdieu’s work, and I have used him myself to make sense of cultural capital, 
fields and habitus. But he has become over-referenced in cultural sociology. Just as Derrida 
and Foucault were fashionable in the 1990s among academics, Bourdieu is the latest French 
philosopher-sociologist who has become the star around which sociologists shape their own 
ideas. His networked approach to data analysis has allowed cultural sociologists to indulge in 
positivism and scientism, making grand inferences from pretty models (Bottero & Crossley, 
2011; Crossley, 2015). And while this social-network analysis work is useful it is limited in 
what it can tell us about the thoughts and lived experiences of actors as constrained agents. The 
dominance of Bourdieu in cultural sociology is replicated by the dominance of other post-
modern theorists in cultural studies. What this means is an over-theorization of culture and 
alternativity, and an absence of qualitative, empirical research.  
Summary 
Both subject fields have failed through different means to get to groups with the idea 
of the alternative and the marginal: leisure studies has failed through a lack of theory, and 
cultural studies has failed through a lack of empirical research. In the final part of the chapter, 
I will attempt to reconcile leisure and culture, and I will sketch out a new theory and empirical 
programme of alternative leisure that returns to the idea of sub-culture as counter culture. 
Towards a New Theory and Empirical Programme 
Leisure and culture actually represent the same human desire, the same human need for 
expression and freedom. What we want is meaning and purpose: we want to prosper, we want 
to be liked, we want to belong; and we want to believe that our culture and our leisure are our 
own choices that allow us to express that meaning and purpose (Spracklen, 2009, 2011). If we 
believe in some sort of deity or afterlife we may feel this meaning and purpose is directed 
towards the goal of getting satisfaction beyond this world. If we accept the wisdom of modern 
science we reject such extrinsically motivated behaviours and are forced to find meaning and 
purpose on this world: in the moral framework we set in our own heads for what we believe to 
be right or wrong; in the ethical behaviour that shapes our interactions with others; and in the 
people and the work we leave behind when our living cells decay into the atoms and molecules 
from which we are formed. 
The problem we humans face is the inhuman nature of the world in modernity. We live 
in a cruel world where the powerful have increased their grip on us. With the rise of the modern 
nation-state we became citizens in the callous hands of bureaucracies and systems that monitor 
our every move, and our every request for support or information (Habermas, 1984, 1987). The 
modern nation-state measures our health, decides what food and drink we can consume, and 
regulates the sports and leisure activities it thinks are morally bad for us. Our children’s 
education is shaped by politicians seeking re-election and support from right-wing newspapers. 
Universities are judged not by their ability to make fully mature humans but by the proportion 
of graduates in employment. Nation-states inculcate in their citizens discipline and obedience, 
designing nationalist ceremonies and practices, from saluting the flag to allowing the obscene 
notion of hereditary monarchy (the divine right to rule) to continue. Modern nation-states do 
have some things in their favour, where they have them: equality before the law, universal 
franchises, human rights and democratic policy-making. But especially in this new century, 
these rights and freedoms have been challenged and reversed. It is no longer clear that 
governments work in our best interests. In the West, people have become dis-enfranchised and 
alienated from the political systems dominated by corporate lobbyists: politicians and civil 
servants are reviled by citizens across the political spectrum for their self-interest, their 
cultivation of connections with bankers and industrialists, their appointment of friends and 
family to well-paid jobs in the system. Beyond the West, the practices and words of democracy 
are used by evil people to establish ugly dictatorships with ideology (socialism, nationalism, 
Islamism) a patina for self-enrichment.  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, politicians and policy-makers seemed to be 
determined to build a better world, where there was social welfare, education for all, universal 
human rights, and more equality. The public sphere was dominated by people working to the 
goal of making other people’s lives better, at the level of nation-states and in trans-national 
organization such as the European Union and the United Nations. There was an awareness 
about the huge structural inequalities that dominated modernity as they dominated pre-modern 
cultures. On structural inequalities associated with race and gender, legislation was passed in 
many countries that outlawed racial and gender discrimination. Racial inequality in the West 
was a deeply problematic product of early modernity, specifically the American use of slaves 
and the imperialist expansion of European countries into countries beyond Europe. As neither 
of these historical circumstances has been fully addressed, the problems of inequality continue. 
Gender inequality, while legislated against and fought against in the cultural space of the public 
sphere, also continues to shape the modern world and make women less free and less powerful 
than men. And the victories earned by radical feminists in the late twentieth century – from 
autonomy to abortion rights – are being questioned by two kinds of gender traditionalists: by 
religious fundamentalists in Christianity and Islam, who insist on women being subservient, 
modest and secondary to men in the family because their god says so; and by the men’s 
movement in the alt-right, who believe women to be biologically inferior and therefore unable 
to have the same rights in the public sphere as men.  
The inequality and injustice in the modern world is caused by the gross acceptance of 
the instrumental rationality of capitalism. The neo-liberal form of global capitalism argues that 
any given society or nation-state will be better off if markets are allowed to operate freely 
(Habermas, 1989). The theory goes that people can make better deals as buyers and sellers at 
the market rate. Better deals mean more profits, and more wealth, which is used by the rich to 
spend on goods, which returns the money to the economy. There is no doubt that capitalism 
has increased the overall wealth of the world, and some of that wealth transfers to the poor 
through rich people buying the services and goods of the poor – and some of the wealth created 
can be taken by nation-states in the form of taxes, which can be and has been directed at the 
welfare of citizens. Capitalism has historically been the driver behind the Industrial Revolution, 
the development of modern science, and more recently the digital revolution (Briggs & Burke, 
2009; Spracklen, 2011, 2015). But there are huge problems with the theory of capitalism, and 
the neo-liberal ideology in which it operates today. In the West at the height of modernity, 
capitalism needed well-trained and relatively contented working classes. Workers were of 
course cheated out of the worth of their labour in the mills and the factories, and capitalists 
stamped down on trade-union activity as much as they could, but the capitalists knew they 
needed the workers: from the utopian settlements of Saltaire and Port Sunlight to legislation 
on working hours and unemployment benefits, capitalists recognized the value of their workers 
and the working-classes more generally. With the rise of global capitalism and neo-liberalism, 
there has been a shattering of the symbiotic relationship between the classes in the West: the 
traditional working-classes have lost their well-paid jobs because global capitalism has re-
located mining and industry to cheaper countries, and are now reduced to social welfare or 
temporary, part-time labour in the ‘precariat’; at the same time, the ruling classes have become 
a global elite making their billions, while the middle-classes feel increasingly squeezed by the 
austerity enforced by governments too scared to tax the global rich who are taking all the money 
being made and keeping it. 
It is no surprise that in these strange, uncertain times, people turn to religion for solace. 
There is much alienation, despair, anger and unhappiness. In the period of high modernity, it 
was easier to find belonging and meaning and purpose in the workplace, or in radical politics. 
In this world dominated by neo-liberalism and global capitalism, where work is precarious and 
monotonous, where the public sphere has been co-opted by corporate interests, leisure and 
culture offer the only spaces where meaning can be found. Becoming alternative is one of the 
few freedoms we have to express what Habermas (1984, 1987) calls communicative rationality. 
Becoming alternative is, as it always was, a way to express dissent with the norms and values 
of the ruling elites. Being alternative, one enlists in the maintenance of communicative leisure, 
of communicative culture, resisting the hegemony of the instrumentality of the corporate 
mainstream (Spracklen, 2009). Communicative leisure is the form of leisure we freely choose 
as human agents, agreeing with each other about what we would like to do with our free time, 
finding our own space to pursue happiness, wellbeing and pleasure. Communicative culture is 
the form of culture we construct in a free exchange of ideas about what constitutes good culture. 
Being alternative, then, is truly counter-hegemonic, and an expression of our humanity and our 
rejection of the betrayal of the lifeworld. So if being alternative ceases to be counter-
hegemonic, if counter culture becomes merely sub-culture or trend or neo-tribe, it stops being 
true to its original purpose. In that instance, the alternative is no longer marginal because it is 
part of the cultural industries, part of the discourse of production and consumption, part of the 
discourse of hegemony and legitimation. 
A new theory of alternativity, then, sees it as an expression of communicative leisure 
and culture and a rejection of instrumental leisure and culture. This new theory sees 
alternativity’s only moral value in being a counter-hegemonic, counter-cultural space – which 
is only what Stuart Hall recognized many years ago. But this new theory uses the insight of 
Habermas to map the hegemonic power onto the logic of instrumentality: we can see how 
genuine alternativity, by definition marginal, is commodified and made non-alternative where 
ever instrumentality works unquestioned and unopposed. But how can we oppose 
instrumentality? Habermas is not entirely clear we can. But I think it should be possible to 
resist through alternativity, because alternativity has such a deep history in human cultures. 
There is always a feeling of dis-satisfaction with the things we are told are right and true. So 
we need an empirical research programme to explore precisely how a different alternative 
spaces and activities may be counter-hegemonic, or lost to instrumentality, so we can help 
humans continue to make sense of their place in the world as free-thinking humans. 
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